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As the leadership of the European Union hands over the baton to a new management this autumn, will the winds of 
change blow also through the cobwebs of the EU’s enlargement agenda? 
 
Jean-Claude Juncker – the incoming President of the European Commission – has already promised to put the gearbox of 
further EU widening in neutral for the next five years of his mandate, and has designated the Austrian Johannes Hahn as 
Commissioner for the re-baptised portfolio of now European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
instructing him to focus on the Union’s political and economic ties with Southern and Eastern Europe, and in particular with 
the Balkans. 
 
Such an approach in the field of enlargement – once crowned the jewel of EU foreign policy – has all the appeal of a damp 
rag but does not necessarily depart from the festina lente strategy of the recent past. Inside the Union, political appetite 
and public support for expansion have been fizzling since Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and were then severely 
curbed in the context of the on-going crisis by growing fears of importing organised crime and migrants from the Balkans. 
Juncker’s logic of consolidation sounds depressingly similar to what it supposedly replaces and incidentally, it also fits 
neatly with the unambitious and inward-looking mantra favoured at present in discussions at all levels on the future of 
European integration, more generally. 
 
With the 28-member block determined to catch its breath in the immediate time period, and given that even the forerunner 
countries in the Balkans – that is, Montenegro and Serbia – will realistically need more than five years to complete their 
accession talks, what priorities should guide Commissioner Hahn, soon to be Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement Negotiations – when they get down to business on 1 November? 
 
The red flags on the to-do list 
 
A three-fold plan of action could potentially turn this envisioned pause in enlargement into an active respite that can help to 
build on hard-earned achievements and to encourage much-needed progress on reforms in the region. 
 
First, the situation of the Balkan aspirants at the back of the EU membership queue screams out for attention. This 
concerns most directly Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the prospect of 
accession and the tools deployed by the Union do not seem to have any bearing on these countries’ will to reform and 
progress. A deep crisis of politics and state institutions has effectively brought the process of EU integration to a complete 
halt in Bosnia-Herzegovina, threatening its socio-economic development but also domestic stability. The name dispute 
with Greece has prevented Skopje from starting accession negotiations with the EU but the real problem has become the 
incapacity of its political elites to resist backsliding, especially in democratic terms. It is imperative that the Union finds 
ways to engage with these two ‘laggards’ while they are stuck in the waiting room, least of all to dispel any latent security 
risks. The EU might have to learn new tricks and start looking for inspiration in its successful mediation of the Serbia-
Kosovo dialogue, putting the diplomatic skills of the new European external affairs chief – the Italian, Federica Mogherini – 
to a first test in her own country’s ‘neck of the woods’. 
 
Second, the ground lost on structural reforms in throughout the Balkans sets off alarm bells. The priority given to stability 
and political conditions should be balanced with an increased emphasis on placing the broken Balkan economies on a 
healthy footing. Economic policies should enjoy full parity with good governance issues, with social aspects of the 
transformation not forgotten. Reducing budget deficits, creating jobs, boosting growth, and improving competitiveness are 
not just vital goals for the European Union but also urgent objectives for the Balkan region. Economic and social 
investments remain key, along with greater cooperation between the EU, the Balkans, and countries in the region. 
Fostering common energy, transport, trade, business, educational, and cultural projects are both part of a win-win scenario 






for the Union and the Balkans, as well as a rational course of action in light of our shared challenges and destiny. 
Individual member states have a role to play in intensifying links and contacts with the Balkans and so does the 
Commission, such as via its Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II). Helping Kosovo secure soon visa-free travel 
is another way of bringing the European family closer together. Making good on the promise of prosperity affixed to the EU 
membership perspective is the best means to keep the credibility of the integration process and to demonstrate that the 
orange speck currently visible on the horizon is in fact still a real carrot. 
 
Third, the waning political attention to enlargement in the EU capitals is a big thorn in the enlargement’s and the 
Commission’s side. The firm commitment voiced this August in Berlin by Germany and Austria to the European future of 
the Balkans is a welcome development, especially if it manages to rally more and more supporters among the other 
member states. However, it is equally important that initiatives of the Merkel type complement the Commission’s work on 
the dossier and do not end up in a duplication of efforts to assess and assist with progress in the Balkan countries. Distrust 
in the EU vis-à-vis the Commission, and the latest tendency of the Member States in the Council to rely on national 
evaluations – rather than on the opinion of the Brussels’ executive about the region is counterproductive. Instead of 
stepping on each other’s toes, Member States and the Commission should stick to the division of labour specified by the 
Treaties so as to preserve the integrity and leverage of the integration process. Moreover, the Commission and the 
advocates of enlargement in the Member States should endeavour to expose the false choice between dealing first with 
concerns on the home front and then with hurdles in the Balkans. The case against sequencing the crisis and enlargement 
should be resolutely uttered: the striking similarity of political and socio-economic problems in the EU and the region begs 
for joint solutions in an era when Europe’s global influence is shrinking. 
 
These three main dimensions of action speak to the EU and cannot of course, substitute for the huge responsibility that 
the Balkans have in diligently doing their piling ‘homework’ if they wish to advance towards membership. But if the 
European Union is to go ‘step-by-step’ on enlargement, tackling these three difficult areas could ensure that each step 
taken is one in front and not in the same place or back. 
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